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United States of America, Plaintiff,
v.
Warren F. Young and Beverly A. Young, Defendants.
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56 A.F.T.R.2d 85-5196
85-2 USTC P 9643
No. 83-C-609-B.
United States District Court,
N.D. Oklahoma.
Sept. 18, 1984.
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Action was
brought against taxpayer for unpaid assessments of federal income
tax liabilities. The District Court, Brett, J., held that: (1) the
corporation formed by the taxpayer was to be considered a corporation,
even though its charter was suspended for failure to pay Oklahoma
franchise taxes, and (2) the taxpayer was entitled to a deduction
for payments he made on behalf of the corporation where those payments
were made to preserve, protect and promote the taxpayer's established
trade or business.
Judgment for defendants.
William W. Guild, Rick
K. Disney, Michael Gibson, Attys. Tax Division, Dept. of Justice,
Dallas, Tex., for plaintiff.
Reece B. Morrel, Tulsa,
Okl., for defendants.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
BRETT, District Judge.
This case was tried to
the Court sitting without a jury on August 8 and 9, 1984. It is
a civil action brought by the United States of America against the
defendants, Warren F. Young and Beverly A. Young, for unpaid assessments
of federal income tax liabilities for the years 1972 through 1974,
inclusive. After consideration of the evidence, the applicable legal
authorities, and the arguments of counsel, the Court enters the
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The defendants are
residents of Tulsa, Oklahoma and are within the jurisdiction of
this Court.
2. Warren Young is presently
a practicing attorney at law and was so during the years in issue.
3. On August 15, 1968,
Warren Young filed Articles of Incorporation with the Oklahoma Secretary
of State's office for a corporation called Western Sanitation Company
("WSC"). WSC was a business formed by Warren Young and
of which he was the principal owner, at the urging of one of his
law business clients who owed him money, the purpose of which was
to operate a residential and commercial refuse hauling business.
4. As part of the Articles
of Incorporation, Warren Young signed an Affidavit as to Paid in
Capital which swore that the amount of stated capital had been fully
paid in.
5. Concerning WSC functioning
as a corporation the evidence established the following:
A. No stock was ever
actually issued to a stockholder and the $500.00 paid in capital,
contrary to the affidavit of Warren F. Young, was not paid to the
corporation. The bylaws were never signed by all of the directors
of the corporation. The minutes of the first meeting of the shareholders
and directors of WSC was only signed by Warren Young. Thereafter,
no records of shareholders' or directors' meeting were maintained
or kept.
B. WSC was operated for
home office and accounting purposes out of the law office of Warren
F. Young. (FN1) There was occasional commingling of funds between
Mr. Young's law office account, personal account and that of WSC.
Mr. Young's legal secretary kept the accounting records and performed
the administrative tasks for WSC. WSC's only employees were individuals
hired to drive WSC refuse collection trucks.
C. The annual city license
for trash hauling was in the name of Warren F. Young, d/b/a Western
Sanitation Company.
D. All operating capital
was secured by Mr. Young and with him personally liable. Initial
assets were not actually transferred or conveyed to the corporation.
E. Western Sanitation
Company filed federal corporate income tax returns for at least
the years 1968, 1969, 1972, 1973 and 1974.
F. On November 16, 1970,
Western Sanitation Company filed a Form 1139 Corporation Application
for Tentative Refund From Carryback of Net Operating Loss and Unused
Investment Credit.
G. Western Sanitation
Company filed corporate employment tax returns on Forms 941 for
at least the periods ended September 30, 1968; December 31, 1968;
March 31, 1969; June 30, 1969; September 30, 1969; December 31,
1969; March 31, 1970; June 30, 1970; December 31, 1970; March 31,
1971; December 31, 1971; March 31, 1972; June 30, 1972; September
30, 1972; December 31, 1972; March 31, 1973; June 30, 1973; September
30, 1973; December 31, 1973; March 31, 1974; June 30, 1974; September
30, 1974; and December 31, 1974.
H. The Internal Revenue
Service accepted all of these corporate tax returns.
I. On February 25, 1972,
the Oklahoma Tax Commission entered its order directing the Secretary
of State to enter of record the suspension of WSC's corporate charter
and the forfeiture of all rights thereunder for failure to comply
with the requirements of the Oklahoma Franchise Tax Act. On February
28, 1974, the Oklahoma Tax Commission entered an order directing
reinstatement of WSC's charter.
6. For federal tax purposes
the Court concludes WSC was a corporation incorporated under the
laws of the State of Oklahoma.
7. During the calendar
year 1974, Revenue Agent Arthur Hale ("Hale") came to
defendant Warren F. Young's law office to audit defendants' tax
return, Form 1040, for the calendar year 1971, and to secure returns
for Western Sanitation Company and defendants' Forms 1040 which
at that time were delinquent. Hale spent considerable time at Young's
office until August 1975, assisting Young's employees with the preparation
of WSC's tax forms and defendants' Forms 1040.
8. During the month of
August, 1975, because defendants had not completed and filed WSC's
returns FYE July 31, 1973 and FYE July 31, 1974, nor their Forms
1040 for the calendar years 1972, 1973 and 1974, Hale prepared returns
for said periods pursuant to authority granted the Secretary under
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 ("Code"). Hale's returns
reflected, inter alia, the following:
(i) WSC'S Forms 1120:
FYE: 7/31/73 7/31/74
---------- -------------
Taxable Income $ 9,611.67 ($ 62,075.00)
(ii) Defendants' Forms
1040:
Calendar Years: 1972
1973 1974
------------ ------------ -----------
Taxable Income: $115,690.74 $ 107,262.92 $ 98,168.10
Tax: $ 48,830.37 $ 44,804.46 $ 40,436.85
9. WSC's returns prepared
by Hale were signed by Hale and dated August 20, 1975. Defendants'
returns prepared by Hale were signed by Hale and dated August 26,
1975.
10. Defendant Warren
F. Young executed the return prepared by Hale for WSC's FYE July
31, 1974, and filed it on October 14, 1975. Defendant Warren F.
Young did not execute the return prepared by Hale for WSC's FYE
July 31, 1973, but executed and filed a return for that fiscal year
on or about October 10, 1975, reporting a loss of $45,085.83, in
contrast to Hale's return showing income of $9,611.67. Defendant
Warren F. Young added the following note to the return he executed
and filed FYE July 31, 1973:
"Prepared from best
available information at this time but will probably be amended."
11. Before defendants
were able to determine WSC's losses allowable for each Form 1040
year, Hale advised defendants that he had no choice but to file
Forms 1040 he had prepared unless defendants filed returns for those
periods prior to January 1, 1976. Defendants neither executed nor
filed any of the Forms 1040 prepared for them by Revenue Agent Arthur
Hale.
12. On December 23, 1975,
defendants filed their 1972 income tax return. That return reflected
a balance due the IRS of $3,508.
13. On December 23, 1975,
defendants filed their 1973 income tax return. That return reflected
a balance due the IRS of $11,522.
14. On December 23, 1975,
defendants filed their 1974 income tax return. That return reflected
a balance due of $11,608.
15. All three of these
returns were delinquent at the time they were filed.
16. Based on the information
contained in those original returns, a delegate of the Secretary
of the Treasury made assessments against Mr. and Mrs. Young according
to the following schedule:
Tax Year Date of
Assessment Type of
Assessment Amount of
Assessment Amount
Unpaid
------
----------- ----------------------- ---------------- ----------------
1972
8/22/77
Income Tax
Delinquency Pen.
Estimated Tax Pen.
Failure to Pay Pen.
Assessed Interest $3,508.00
627.00
95.33
564.30
738.43 -0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
$44.24
-----------
$ 5,533.06 -----------
$ 44.24
1973
7/25/77
Income Tax
Delinquency Pen.
Failure to Pay Pen.
Assessed Interest $11,522.00
2,630.50
1,841.35
2,409.34 $10,522.00
2,630.50
1,841.35
2,409.34
-----------
$18,403.19 -----------
$17,403.19
1974
7/18/77
Income Tax
Delinquency Pen.
Failure to Pay Pen.
Assessed Interest $11,608.00
2,902.00
1,325.42
1,933.57 $11,608.00
2,902,00
1,325.42
1,933.57
-----------
$17,768.99 -----------
$17,768.99
17. After audit of defendants'
returns for the years 1972 through 1974, the Internal Revenue Service
sent a Notice of Deficiency to Mr. and Mrs. Young on June 26, 1978.
18. As a result of that
audit, additional taxes were assessed against the defendants according
to the following schedule:
Tax Year Date of
Assessment Type of
Assessment Amount of
Assessment Amount
Unpaid
------
----------- ----------------------- ---------------- ----------------
1972
11/06/78
Income Tax
Delinquency Pen.
Negligence Pen.
Assessed Interest $ 251.02
62.75
187.95
93.17 $ 251.02
62.75
187.95
93.17
-----------
$ 594.89 -----------
$ 594.89
1973
11/06/78
Income Tax
Delinquency Pen.
Negligence Pen.
Assessed Interest $ 4,515.58
1,129.00
801.90
1,405.23 $ 4,515.58
1,129.00
801.90
1,405.23
-----------
$ 7,851.71 -----------
$ 7,851.71
1974
11/07/78
Income Tax
Delinquency Pen.
Negligence Pen.
Assessed Interest $ 1,509.84
377.46
655.89
379.27 $ 1,509.84
377.46
655.89
379.27
-----------
$ 2,922.46 -----------
$ 2,922.46
19. The defendants' 1971
tax return had been audited earlier and their 1971 taxable income
had been increased. Defendants did not contest this adjustment.
20. The Internal Revenue
Service adjustment to defendants' 1972 income tax liability related
solely to the correction of a math error and the use of the corrected
1971 taxable income in defendants' 1972 Schedule G--Income Averaging.
21. The Internal Revenue
Service adjustment to defendants' 1973 income tax liability related
to two items: (1) The use of the corrected taxable incomes for 1971
and 1972 in defendants' 1973 Schedule G--Income Averaging; and (2)
the disallowance of a claimed nonbusiness bad debt deduction to
Western Sanitation Company in the amount of $20,784.74.
22. The Internal Revenue
Service adjustments to defendants' 1974 income tax liability related
to three items: (1) The use of the corrected taxable incomes for
1971, 1972 and 1973 in defendants' 1974 Schedule G--Income Averaging;
(2) the disallowance of a claimed deduction for a nonbusiness bad
debt to Western Sanitation Company in the amount of $12,733.96;
and (3) the inclusion of an additional $1,000 in attorneys fees
not reported on the original return.
23. On April 19, 1976,
defendants filed an Amended Tax Return (Form 1040X) for 1972. On
that return, defendants alleged that Western Sanitation Company
was a sole proprietorship rather than a corporation. Therefore,
defendants claimed that they were entitled to a Schedule C loss
of $20,201 for 1972 resulting from the operation of Western Sanitation
Company. Defendants claimed a resulting tax liability of $0 for
1972.
24. The Internal Revenue
Service rejected this claim.
25. On June 22, 1976,
defendants filed an Amended Tax Return (Form 1040X) for 1973. On
that return, defendants alleged that Western Sanitation Company
was a sole proprietorship rather than a corporation. Therefore,
defendants claimed that they were entitled to a Schedule C loss
of $52,188 resulting from the operation of Western Sanitation Company.
They also claimed a casualty loss of $17,320 and an increase in
their Schedule D income of $18,911. Defendants claimed a resulting
tax liability of $0 for 1973.
26. The Internal Revenue
Service rejected this claim.
27. On July 2, 1976,
defendants filed an Amended Tax Return (Form 1040X) for 1974. On
that return, defendants alleged that Western Sanitation Company
was a sole proprietorship rather than a corporation. Therefore,
defendants claimed that they were entitled to a Schedule C loss
of $38,216 resulting from the operation of Western Sanitation Company.
They also claimed an adjustment to their self-employment tax. Defendants
claimed a resulting tax liability of $674 for 1974.
28. The Internal Revenue
Service rejected this claim.
29. Defendants advanced
funds either to, or on behalf of, WSC in at least the following
amounts (in excess of repayments) for the years in question: $87,116.33
for 1972; $37,580.89 for 1973; and $37,713.88 for 1974. Most of
these advances were in the form of checks written on the account
of Warren F. Young, Attorney, and either payable to WSC or WSC's
creditors. (The issue is whether these advances were capital contributions
or some form of properly deductible expense of the defendants on
their personal income tax returns).
30. Due to the poor financial
condition of WSC, its liabilities considerably exceeding its assets,
it was apparent to Mr. Young in 1971 and 1972, that the business
could not be salvaged. In late 1971 WSC had in excess of $200,000
in liabilities, including notes payable to banks of approximately
$170,000. Since Mr. Young's law practice was financed from the same
principal source as WSC, the continued financial viability of Young's
law practice was being threatened.
31. Starting in 1971
Mr. Young made numerous attempts to sell WSC at any price in order
to get the buyer to assume WSC's debts.
32. Mr. Young was finally
able to get rid of WSC in 1974. The only way he was able to get
rid of the business was to let two trash haulers, who were making
modest monthly salaries and who had questionable credit standing,
take over the operations. Even then he had to go to the bank and
borrow additional money to fix up the business before the trash
haulers agreed to take over the operations.
33. The two trash haulers
were supposed to assume the debt of WSC but the bank knew the two
individuals could not afford to pay the liability and the bank continued
to hold Mr. Young individually liable. When the two individuals
did not pay on the debt, Mr. Young would go to the bank and make
the payment. Mr. Young did not personally receive any money from
the two trash haulers since the money was turned over to the bank
to reduce the amount of the debt.
34. During this time
period (late 1971 through 1974), Mr. Young was genuinely concerned
that his reputation as an attorney would be adversely affected by
either WSC's failure to pay its obligations, or his failure to stand
good for the debts of WSC.
35. In Mr. Young's oil
and gas law practice approximately three-fourths of his clientele
and income was generated by two clients, Texaco, Inc. and Apache
Oil Company. In his representation of these clients Mr. Young would
purchase leases in his name for and on behalf of Texaco and/or Apache.
Mr. Young would also perform the legal work in reference to the
contracts, title search, and documents to consummate the transactions.
Mr. Young would actually arrange financing for the leases through
the bank he did business with, The First National Bank and Trust
Company of Tulsa, Oklahoma. The financing of such mineral lease
acquisitions in his name on behalf of Texaco and/or Apache ranged
as high as $750,000. For Mr. Young to maintain and continue in his
established oil and gas law practice, it was necessary for him to
maintain a good credit rating because neither Texaco nor Apache
would continue to employ him as an oil and gas attorney if he were
unable to personally finance the lease acquisitions for and on behalf
of his clients, Texaco and/or Apache.
36. Mr. Young made payments
on behalf of WSC in order to preserve, protect, and continue his
existing business as an oil and gas practicing attorney. The principal
motivation of Young in making the payments on behalf of WSC in the
years in question was not as a capital contribution or investment
but essentially for the purpose of protecting his personal credit
rating to prevent the collapse of his oil and gas law practice and
loss of his principal clientele. It was apparent to Mr. Young in
making these advances he was not adding to the salable value of
WSC, because he had known since approximately 1971 the business
was, for all practical purposes without any equity value.
37. Under the facts of
this case, the Court concludes that defendants can deduct said advances
and expenditures as ordinary and necessary business expenses from
their personal income tax returns for the years in question under
Sec. 162 of the Internal Revenue Code.
38. Defendants did not
have any unpaid tax liability for the years 1972 through 1974 and
they are entitled to a refund on the amounts already paid on these
assessments.
39. Defendants did keep
reasonable books and records as required by law and therefore were
not negligent in failing to do so.
40. Any Conclusion of
Law which might be properly characterized a Finding of Fact is hereby
incorporated herein.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. This Court has jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the parties to this action.
2. The question of whether
a corporation was formed in the first place is a question of local
law. Skarda v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 137, 144 (1956), aff'd 250
F.2d 429 (10th Cir.1957). However, whether the corporate entity
(if found to exist) should be disregarded for federal tax purposes
is a question of federal law. Carver v. United States, 412 F.2d
233 (Ct.Cl.1969); Stoody v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 710, 715 (1976).
3. A corporation is subject
to federal corporate income tax liability as long as it continues
to do business in a corporate manner, even if its recognized status
under state law is terminated. Messer v. Commissioner, 438 F.2d
774 (3rd Cir.1971).
4. Since WSC did business
as a corporation, and was held out by its principal owner and defendant,
Warren F. Young, to the federal taxing authorities to be a corporation,
for federal tax purposes it should be considered a corporate entity.
Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 63 S.Ct.
1132, 87 L.Ed. 1499 (1943); Crouch v. United States, 692 F.2d 97
(10th Cir.1982).
5. A valid corporation
will be disregarded for federal tax purposes only after the state
has formally revoked a corporation's charter. McDonnell v. Commissioner,
34 T.C.M. (P-H) para. 65,125 (1965); Wootan v. Commissioner, 24
T.C.M. (P-H) para. 55,191 (1955).
6. Since the 1968 amendment
to 18 Okl.St.Ann. Sec. 1.198a (1983 Supp.) there is no automatic
revocation of a corporate charter for failure to pay franchise taxes
in Oklahoma. Present law provides for unlimited suspension with
the corporation having the right to reinstate its charter at any
time before the expiration of its Articles of Incorporation. Simmons
v. Alliance Corp., 79 F.R.D. 547, 548 (W.D.Okla.1978).
7. Although its charter
was suspended from February of 1972 until it was reinstated in February
of 1974, WSC was a corporation for federal tax purposes during calendar
years 1972-1974.
8. Expenditures incurred
by a taxpayer to protect or promote taxpayer's business or business
reputation or to preserve, protect, and promote the credit and goodwill
of taxpayer's business have been regarded as deductible. Marks v.
Commissioner, 27 T.C. 464 (1956); Max Lutz and Ruth Lutz v. Commissioner,
282 F.2d 614 (5th Cir.1960); Harold L. and Temple M. Jenkins, 52
T.C.M. (P-H) para. 83,667; James O. Gould v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.
132 (1975); William A. Thompson, Jr. and Betty A. Thompson, 52 T.C.M.
(P-H) para. 83,487; Samuel R. Milbank v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 805
(1969); Cubbedge Snow v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 585 (1958); Paul
Draper v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 201 (1956); William L. Butler v.
Commissioner, 17 T.C. 675.
9. A taxpayer may properly
recognize a moral obligation in paying the debt of another. Dunn
& McCarthy, Inc. v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 242 (2nd Cir.1943);
C. Doris H. Pepper v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 886 (1961). In this
situation the jurisprudence does not require a precise similarity
or strong connexity between the business benefited and the taxpayer
making the payment. Robert Garland, Inc., 41 B.T.A. 119 (1940);
Charles J. Dinardo v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 430 (1954); Samuel R.
Milbank v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 805 (1969).
10. Payments to protect
a business often involve situations where the taxpayer's name, tradename,
brand, patent, license or surname is involved. Canton Cotton Mills,
94 F.Supp. 561 (1951); U.S. v. E.L. Bruce, 180 F.2d 846 (6th Cir.1950);
James L. Lohrke v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 679 (1967); L. Heller and
Son v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 1109 (1949); Joseph J. McGee v. Nee,
113 F.2d 543 (8th Cir.1940).
11. The taxpayer sought
to preserve, protect and promote defendant's established trade and
business as an attorney and is entitled to a deduction under Section
162 of the Internal Revenue Code.
12. Any Conclusion of
Law herein which might be properly characterized a Finding of Fact
should be incorporated as a Finding of Fact.
13. In keeping with these
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and contemporaneous herewith
a separate judgment should be entered entering judgment in favor
of the defendants, Warren F. Young and Beverly A. Young, and against
the plaintiff, the United States of America.
FN1. The decision to
run a trash hauling business from one's law office has both ethical
and practical considerations. Certainly it runs head on into the
professional axiom, "the law is a jealous mistress." There
is enough unwitting refuse in the law business that one should not
wittingly increase its scope.
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