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United States of America, Plaintiff,
v.
Warren F. Young and Beverly A. Young, Defendants.
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56 A.F.T.R.2d 85-5196
85-2 USTC P 9643
No. 83-C-609-B.
United States District Court,
N.D. Oklahoma.
Sept. 18, 1984.
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SAction
was brought against taxpayer for unpaid assessments of federal income
tax liabilities. The District Court, Brett, J., held that: (1) the
corporation formed by the taxpayer was to be considered a corporation,
even though its charter was suspended for failure to pay Oklahoma
franchise taxes, and (2) the taxpayer was entitled to a deduction
for payments he made on behalf of the corporation where those payments
were made to preserve, protect and promote the taxpayer's established
trade or business.
Judgment
for defendants.
William
W. Guild, Rick K. Disney, Michael Gibson, Attys. Tax Division, Dept.
of Justice, Dallas, Tex., for plaintiff.
Reece
B. Morrel, Tulsa, Okl., for defendants.
FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
BRETT,
District Judge.
This
case was tried to the Court sitting without a jury on August 8 and
9, 1984. It is a civil action brought by the United States of America
against the defendants, Warren F. Young and Beverly A. Young, for
unpaid assessments of federal income tax liabilities for the years
1972 through 1974, inclusive. After consideration of the evidence,
the applicable legal authorities, and the arguments of counsel,
the Court enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law:
FINDINGS
OF FACT
1.
The defendants are residents of Tulsa, Oklahoma and are within the
jurisdiction of this Court.
2.
Warren Young is presently a practicing attorney at law and was so
during the years in issue.
3.
On August 15, 1968, Warren Young filed Articles of Incorporation
with the Oklahoma Secretary of State's office for a corporation
called Western Sanitation Company ("WSC"). WSC was a business
formed by Warren Young and of which he was the principal owner,
at the urging of one of his law business clients who owed him money,
the purpose of which was to operate a residential and commercial
refuse hauling business.
4.
As part of the Articles of Incorporation, Warren Young signed an
Affidavit as to Paid in Capital which swore that the amount of stated
capital had been fully paid in.
5.
Concerning WSC functioning as a corporation the evidence established
the following:
A.
No stock was ever actually issued to a stockholder and the $500.00
paid in capital, contrary to the affidavit of Warren F. Young, was
not paid to the corporation. The bylaws were never signed by all
of the directors of the corporation. The minutes of the first meeting
of the shareholders and directors of WSC was only signed by Warren
Young. Thereafter, no records of shareholders' or directors' meeting
were maintained or kept.
B.
WSC was operated for home office and accounting purposes out of
the law office of Warren F. Young. (FN1) There was occasional commingling
of funds between Mr. Young's law office account, personal account
and that of WSC. Mr. Young's legal secretary kept the accounting
records and performed the administrative tasks for WSC. WSC's only
employees were individuals hired to drive WSC refuse collection
trucks.
C.
The annual city license for trash hauling was in the name of Warren
F. Young, d/b/a Western Sanitation Company.
D.
All operating capital was secured by Mr. Young and with him personally
liable. Initial assets were not actually transferred or conveyed
to the corporation.
E.
Western Sanitation Company filed federal corporate income tax returns
for at least the years 1968, 1969, 1972, 1973 and 1974.
F.
On November 16, 1970, Western Sanitation Company filed a Form 1139
Corporation Application for Tentative Refund From Carryback of Net
Operating Loss and Unused Investment Credit.
G.
Western Sanitation Company filed corporate employment tax returns
on Forms 941 for at least the periods ended September 30, 1968;
December 31, 1968; March 31, 1969; June 30, 1969; September 30,
1969; December 31, 1969; March 31, 1970; June 30, 1970; December
31, 1970; March 31, 1971; December 31, 1971; March 31, 1972; June
30, 1972; September 30, 1972; December 31, 1972; March 31, 1973;
June 30, 1973; September 30, 1973; December 31, 1973; March 31,
1974; June 30, 1974; September 30, 1974; and December 31, 1974.
H.
The Internal Revenue Service accepted all of these corporate tax
returns.
I.
On February 25, 1972, the Oklahoma Tax Commission entered its order
directing the Secretary of State to enter of record the suspension
of WSC's corporate charter and the forfeiture of all rights thereunder
for failure to comply with the requirements of the Oklahoma Franchise
Tax Act. On February 28, 1974, the Oklahoma Tax Commission entered
an order directing reinstatement of WSC's charter.
6.
For federal tax purposes the Court concludes WSC was a corporation
incorporated under the laws of the State of Oklahoma.
7.
During the calendar year 1974, Revenue Agent Arthur Hale ("Hale")
came to defendant Warren F. Young's law office to audit defendants'
tax return, Form 1040, for the calendar year 1971, and to secure
returns for Western Sanitation Company and defendants' Forms 1040
which at that time were delinquent. Hale spent considerable time
at Young's office until August 1975, assisting Young's employees
with the preparation of WSC's tax forms and defendants' Forms 1040.
8.
During the month of August, 1975, because defendants had not completed
and filed WSC's returns FYE July 31, 1973 and FYE July 31, 1974,
nor their Forms 1040 for the calendar years 1972, 1973 and 1974,
Hale prepared returns for said periods pursuant to authority granted
the Secretary under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 ("Code").
Hale's returns reflected, inter alia, the following:
(i)
WSC'S Forms 1120:
FYE:
7/31/73 7/31/74
---------- -------------
Taxable Income $ 9,611.67 ($ 62,075.00)
(ii)
Defendants' Forms 1040:
Calendar
Years: 1972 1973 1974
------------ ------------ -----------
Taxable Income: $115,690.74 $ 107,262.92 $ 98,168.10
Tax: $ 48,830.37 $ 44,804.46 $ 40,436.85
9.
WSC's returns prepared by Hale were signed by Hale and dated August
20, 1975. Defendants' returns prepared by Hale were signed by Hale
and dated August 26, 1975.
10.
Defendant Warren F. Young executed the return prepared by Hale for
WSC's FYE July 31, 1974, and filed it on October 14, 1975. Defendant
Warren F. Young did not execute the return prepared by Hale for
WSC's FYE July 31, 1973, but executed and filed a return for that
fiscal year on or about October 10, 1975, reporting a loss of $45,085.83,
in contrast to Hale's return showing income of $9,611.67. Defendant
Warren F. Young added the following note to the return he executed
and filed FYE July 31, 1973:
"Prepared
from best available information at this time but will probably be
amended."
11.
Before defendants were able to determine WSC's losses allowable
for each Form 1040 year, Hale advised defendants that he had no
choice but to file Forms 1040 he had prepared unless defendants
filed returns for those periods prior to January 1, 1976. Defendants
neither executed nor filed any of the Forms 1040 prepared for them
by Revenue Agent Arthur Hale.
12.
On December 23, 1975, defendants filed their 1972 income tax return.
That return reflected a balance due the IRS of $3,508.
13.
On December 23, 1975, defendants filed their 1973 income tax return.
That return reflected a balance due the IRS of $11,522.
14.
On December 23, 1975, defendants filed their 1974 income tax return.
That return reflected a balance due of $11,608.
15.
All three of these returns were delinquent at the time they were
filed.
16.
Based on the information contained in those original returns, a
delegate of the Secretary of the Treasury made assessments against
Mr. and Mrs. Young according to the following schedule:
Tax Year Date of
Assessment Type of
Assessment Amount of
Assessment Amount
Unpaid
------
----------- ----------------------- ---------------- ----------------
1972
8/22/77
Income Tax
Delinquency Pen.
Estimated Tax Pen.
Failure to Pay Pen.
Assessed Interest $3,508.00
627.00
95.33
564.30
738.43 -0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
$44.24
-----------
$ 5,533.06 -----------
$ 44.24
1973
7/25/77
Income Tax
Delinquency Pen.
Failure to Pay Pen.
Assessed Interest $11,522.00
2,630.50
1,841.35
2,409.34 $10,522.00
2,630.50
1,841.35
2,409.34
-----------
$18,403.19 -----------
$17,403.19
1974
7/18/77
Income Tax
Delinquency Pen.
Failure to Pay Pen.
Assessed Interest $11,608.00
2,902.00
1,325.42
1,933.57 $11,608.00
2,902,00
1,325.42
1,933.57
-----------
$17,768.99 -----------
$17,768.99
17.
After audit of defendants' returns for the years 1972 through 1974,
the Internal Revenue Service sent a Notice of Deficiency to Mr.
and Mrs. Young on June 26, 1978.
18.
As a result of that audit, additional taxes were assessed against
the defendants according to the following schedule:
Tax Year Date of
Assessment Type of
Assessment Amount of
Assessment Amount
Unpaid
------
----------- ----------------------- ---------------- ----------------
1972
11/06/78
Income Tax
Delinquency Pen.
Negligence Pen.
Assessed Interest $ 251.02
62.75
187.95
93.17 $ 251.02
62.75
187.95
93.17
-----------
$ 594.89 -----------
$ 594.89
1973
11/06/78
Income Tax
Delinquency Pen.
Negligence Pen.
Assessed Interest $ 4,515.58
1,129.00
801.90
1,405.23 $ 4,515.58
1,129.00
801.90
1,405.23
-----------
$ 7,851.71 -----------
$ 7,851.71
1974
11/07/78
Income Tax
Delinquency Pen.
Negligence Pen.
Assessed Interest $ 1,509.84
377.46
655.89
379.27 $ 1,509.84
377.46
655.89
379.27
-----------
$ 2,922.46 -----------
$ 2,922.46
19.
The defendants' 1971 tax return had been audited earlier and their
1971 taxable income had been increased. Defendants did not contest
this adjustment.
20.
The Internal Revenue Service adjustment to defendants' 1972 income
tax liability related solely to the correction of a math error and
the use of the corrected 1971 taxable income in defendants' 1972
Schedule G--Income Averaging.
21.
The Internal Revenue Service adjustment to defendants' 1973 income
tax liability related to two items: (1) The use of the corrected
taxable incomes for 1971 and 1972 in defendants' 1973 Schedule G--Income
Averaging; and (2) the disallowance of a claimed nonbusiness bad
debt deduction to Western Sanitation Company in the amount of $20,784.74.
22.
The Internal Revenue Service adjustments to defendants' 1974 income
tax liability related to three items: (1) The use of the corrected
taxable incomes for 1971, 1972 and 1973 in defendants' 1974 Schedule
G--Income Averaging; (2) the disallowance of a claimed deduction
for a nonbusiness bad debt to Western Sanitation Company in the
amount of $12,733.96; and (3) the inclusion of an additional $1,000
in attorneys fees not reported on the original return.
23.
On April 19, 1976, defendants filed an Amended Tax Return (Form
1040X) for 1972. On that return, defendants alleged that Western
Sanitation Company was a sole proprietorship rather than a corporation.
Therefore, defendants claimed that they were entitled to a Schedule
C loss of $20,201 for 1972 resulting from the operation of Western
Sanitation Company. Defendants claimed a resulting tax liability
of $0 for 1972.
24.
The Internal Revenue Service rejected this claim.
25.
On June 22, 1976, defendants filed an Amended Tax Return (Form 1040X)
for 1973. On that return, defendants alleged that Western Sanitation
Company was a sole proprietorship rather than a corporation. Therefore,
defendants claimed that they were entitled to a Schedule C loss
of $52,188 resulting from the operation of Western Sanitation Company.
They also claimed a casualty loss of $17,320 and an increase in
their Schedule D income of $18,911. Defendants claimed a resulting
tax liability of $0 for 1973.
26.
The Internal Revenue Service rejected this claim.
27.
On July 2, 1976, defendants filed an Amended Tax Return (Form 1040X)
for 1974. On that return, defendants alleged that Western Sanitation
Company was a sole proprietorship rather than a corporation. Therefore,
defendants claimed that they were entitled to a Schedule C loss
of $38,216 resulting from the operation of Western Sanitation Company.
They also claimed an adjustment to their self-employment tax. Defendants
claimed a resulting tax liability of $674 for 1974.
28.
The Internal Revenue Service rejected this claim.
29.
Defendants advanced funds either to, or on behalf of, WSC in at
least the following amounts (in excess of repayments) for the years
in question: $87,116.33 for 1972; $37,580.89 for 1973; and $37,713.88
for 1974. Most of these advances were in the form of checks written
on the account of Warren F. Young, Attorney, and either payable
to WSC or WSC's creditors. (The issue is whether these advances
were capital contributions or some form of properly deductible expense
of the defendants on their personal income tax returns).
30.
Due to the poor financial condition of WSC, its liabilities considerably
exceeding its assets, it was apparent to Mr. Young in 1971 and 1972,
that the business could not be salvaged. In late 1971 WSC had in
excess of $200,000 in liabilities, including notes payable to banks
of approximately $170,000. Since Mr. Young's law practice was financed
from the same principal source as WSC, the continued financial viability
of Young's law practice was being threatened.
31.
Starting in 1971 Mr. Young made numerous attempts to sell WSC at
any price in order to get the buyer to assume WSC's debts.
32.
Mr. Young was finally able to get rid of WSC in 1974. The only way
he was able to get rid of the business was to let two trash haulers,
who were making modest monthly salaries and who had questionable
credit standing, take over the operations. Even then he had to go
to the bank and borrow additional money to fix up the business before
the trash haulers agreed to take over the operations.
33.
The two trash haulers were supposed to assume the debt of WSC but
the bank knew the two individuals could not afford to pay the liability
and the bank continued to hold Mr. Young individually liable. When
the two individuals did not pay on the debt, Mr. Young would go
to the bank and make the payment. Mr. Young did not personally receive
any money from the two trash haulers since the money was turned
over to the bank to reduce the amount of the debt.
34.
During this time period (late 1971 through 1974), Mr. Young was
genuinely concerned that his reputation as an attorney would be
adversely affected by either WSC's failure to pay its obligations,
or his failure to stand good for the debts of WSC.
35.
In Mr. Young's oil and gas law practice approximately three-fourths
of his clientele and income was generated by two clients, Texaco,
Inc. and Apache Oil Company. In his representation of these clients
Mr. Young would purchase leases in his name for and on behalf of
Texaco and/or Apache. Mr. Young would also perform the legal work
in reference to the contracts, title search, and documents to consummate
the transactions. Mr. Young would actually arrange financing for
the leases through the bank he did business with, The First National
Bank and Trust Company of Tulsa, Oklahoma. The financing of such
mineral lease acquisitions in his name on behalf of Texaco and/or
Apache ranged as high as $750,000. For Mr. Young to maintain and
continue in his established oil and gas law practice, it was necessary
for him to maintain a good credit rating because neither Texaco
nor Apache would continue to employ him as an oil and gas attorney
if he were unable to personally finance the lease acquisitions for
and on behalf of his clients, Texaco and/or Apache.
36.
Mr. Young made payments on behalf of WSC in order to preserve, protect,
and continue his existing business as an oil and gas practicing
attorney. The principal motivation of Young in making the payments
on behalf of WSC in the years in question was not as a capital contribution
or investment but essentially for the purpose of protecting his
personal credit rating to prevent the collapse of his oil and gas
law practice and loss of his principal clientele. It was apparent
to Mr. Young in making these advances he was not adding to the salable
value of WSC, because he had known since approximately 1971 the
business was, for all practical purposes without any equity value.
37.
Under the facts of this case, the Court concludes that defendants
can deduct said advances and expenditures as ordinary and necessary
business expenses from their personal income tax returns for the
years in question under Sec. 162 of the Internal Revenue Code.
38.
Defendants did not have any unpaid tax liability for the years 1972
through 1974 and they are entitled to a refund on the amounts already
paid on these assessments.
39.
Defendants did keep reasonable books and records as required by
law and therefore were not negligent in failing to do so.
40.
Any Conclusion of Law which might be properly characterized a Finding
of Fact is hereby incorporated herein.
CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW
1.
This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the parties
to this action.
2.
The question of whether a corporation was formed in the first place
is a question of local law. Skarda v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 137,
144 (1956), aff'd 250 F.2d 429 (10th Cir.1957). However, whether
the corporate entity (if found to exist) should be disregarded for
federal tax purposes is a question of federal law. Carver v. United
States, 412 F.2d 233 (Ct.Cl.1969); Stoody v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.
710, 715 (1976).
3.
A corporation is subject to federal corporate income tax liability
as long as it continues to do business in a corporate manner, even
if its recognized status under state law is terminated. Messer v.
Commissioner, 438 F.2d 774 (3rd Cir.1971).
4.
Since WSC did business as a corporation, and was held out by its
principal owner and defendant, Warren F. Young, to the federal taxing
authorities to be a corporation, for federal tax purposes it should
be considered a corporate entity. Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner,
319 U.S. 436, 63 S.Ct. 1132, 87 L.Ed. 1499 (1943); Crouch v. United
States, 692 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.1982).
5.
A valid corporation will be disregarded for federal tax purposes
only after the state has formally revoked a corporation's charter.
McDonnell v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (P-H) para. 65,125 (1965);
Wootan v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (P-H) para. 55,191 (1955).
6.
Since the 1968 amendment to 18 Okl.St.Ann. Sec. 1.198a (1983 Supp.)
there is no automatic revocation of a corporate charter for failure
to pay franchise taxes in Oklahoma. Present law provides for unlimited
suspension with the corporation having the right to reinstate its
charter at any time before the expiration of its Articles of Incorporation.
Simmons v. Alliance Corp., 79 F.R.D. 547, 548 (W.D.Okla.1978).
7.
Although its charter was suspended from February of 1972 until it
was reinstated in February of 1974, WSC was a corporation for federal
tax purposes during calendar years 1972-1974.
8.
Expenditures incurred by a taxpayer to protect or promote taxpayer's
business or business reputation or to preserve, protect, and promote
the credit and goodwill of taxpayer's business have been regarded
as deductible. Marks v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 464 (1956); Max Lutz
and Ruth Lutz v. Commissioner, 282 F.2d 614 (5th Cir.1960); Harold
L. and Temple M. Jenkins, 52 T.C.M. (P-H) para. 83,667; James O.
Gould v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 132 (1975); William A. Thompson,
Jr. and Betty A. Thompson, 52 T.C.M. (P-H) para. 83,487; Samuel
R. Milbank v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 805 (1969); Cubbedge Snow v.
Commissioner, 31 T.C. 585 (1958); Paul Draper v. Commissioner, 26
T.C. 201 (1956); William L. Butler v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 675.
9.
A taxpayer may properly recognize a moral obligation in paying the
debt of another. Dunn & McCarthy, Inc. v. Commissioner, 139
F.2d 242 (2nd Cir.1943); C. Doris H. Pepper v. Commissioner, 36
T.C. 886 (1961). In this situation the jurisprudence does not require
a precise similarity or strong connexity between the business benefited
and the taxpayer making the payment. Robert Garland, Inc., 41 B.T.A.
119 (1940); Charles J. Dinardo v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 430 (1954);
Samuel R. Milbank v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 805 (1969).
10.
Payments to protect a business often involve situations where the
taxpayer's name, tradename, brand, patent, license or surname is
involved. Canton Cotton Mills, 94 F.Supp. 561 (1951); U.S. v. E.L.
Bruce, 180 F.2d 846 (6th Cir.1950); James L. Lohrke v. Commissioner,
48 T.C. 679 (1967); L. Heller and Son v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 1109
(1949); Joseph J. McGee v. Nee, 113 F.2d 543 (8th Cir.1940).
11.
The taxpayer sought to preserve, protect and promote defendant's
established trade and business as an attorney and is entitled to
a deduction under Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code.
12.
Any Conclusion of Law herein which might be properly characterized
a Finding of Fact should be incorporated as a Finding of Fact.
13.
In keeping with these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
contemporaneous herewith a separate judgment should be entered entering
judgment in favor of the defendants, Warren F. Young and Beverly
A. Young, and against the plaintiff, the United States of America.
FN1.
The decision to run a trash hauling business from one's law office
has both ethical and practical considerations. Certainly it runs
head on into the professional axiom, "the law is a jealous
mistress." There is enough unwitting refuse in the law business
that one should not wittingly increase its scope.
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